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STAn:t1ENT OF NATURE CF THE C/>.SE 
This is an appeal frCJITl an Order denying Defendant's Potion to Set 
P.side and/or fudify a portion of the Decree of Divorce dealing with 
monthly payments of $176.50 made by Defendant to Plaintiff, to be applied 
to rrortgage payments on the hOFe. 
DISPCSITICl1 IN lCWER CaJRT 
Judge Maurice Harding, of the Third District Cot.irt of Salt lake 
County, State of Utah, refused to rrodify or set aside a provision of 
the Divorce Decree, finding that the monthly payrrents of $176.50 paid 
to Plaintiff by the Defendant were part of a property settlerrent (Tr 147) 
and the parties were bound by the decree. However, the C'.ourt lowered 
the arrount to $122. 06 per mmth due to the fact the previous arrount 
included taxes and fire insurance which it held the Defendant was not 
obligated to pay, and ordered Defendant to continue to niake said payrrents 
to the Plaintiff lllltil such time as the total nortgage indebtedness of 
approx:i.Irately $13,000 (Thirteen Thousand Dollars) was fully paid (Tr ll5-ll6). 
RElIEF SaJGlIT CN .APPE.Al. 
1. That this Court find the m:mthly payrrents, to be applied towards 
the rrortgage payment, were in the nature of support and terminated 
upon Plaintiff's rem:rrriage and sale of the property. 
2. Should this Court find said payrrents were part of a property 
settlenl:nt, that it exercise its equitable jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5, and find such a rraterial change of circumstances 
exists that Defendant should not be required to continue said m:mthly 
pavrients. 
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3. In the alternative, that the Court find the provisions of 
the Decree dealing with said m:mthly payments fails because it is fotmded 
upon a stipulation containing a material mistake and remand the case 
so that the issue of who should be held responsible for the unpaid 
installments of the rrnrtgage payments may be litigated. 
STATEMEtil' CF FACTS 
Plaintiff filed a Corrplaint for Divorce on March 26, 1976 (Tr 2-4). 
Defendant answered on April 9, 1976, and asked that the Q:q:>laint be 
dismissed (Tr ). 
Ch January 5, 1977, the parties entered into an agreement entitled 
STIPlITATION, WAIVER MID PROPER'IY SEITLEl1ENI' FOR DIVORCE (Tr ) . 
Defendant withdrew his Pnswer and consented to entry of his default 
consistent with the tenns and ccnditions set forth in the Stipulation. 
The Stipulation provided that, inter alia, Defendant should be awarded 
certain real property in Florida and Plaintiff should be awarded 
the ha;ie and real property in Utah. The Florida property was purchased 
for $3,500.00 and Defendant estimated it was ~th less than that 
at the ti.rre of the divorce (Tr ), whereas, Plaintiff estimated its 
value had increased to $7 , 500. 00 (Tr ) . Plaintiff estimated that the 
bane and real property which she was to receive to be w:>rth $46, 000. 00 
with a rrnrtgage indebedness of $13, 653. 46. 
The Stipulation further provided that Defendant ~d pay $300.00 
per rronth as alim:my; that Defendant would pay to Plaintiff $176.50 
each roonth, to be applied to the rrnrtgage payrrents on the bane; that 
Plaintiff ~ld receive the bulk of the furniture (Tr 137) ; that 
the Defendant should asSt.Jr.)2 and pay any debts incurred during the 
marriage, which arrounted to approximately $4,000.00 (Tr 138); 
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that Plaintiff vJOuld receive the Mlstang car and I:efendant YX>Uld make 
the car payrtents 1.filtil the car was fully paid for; and the Defendant "WOUld 
receive the VoU·.swagon Van. Concerning the rronthly payrrents of $176.50, 
both the Stipulation and the Divorce I:ecree were silent as to the exact 
nature of such payments ; whether they were rrodifiable by either party; 
what effect Plaintiff's death or remarriage or Defendant's death, or 
sale of the hane YX>Uld have on them; and whether such payments were to be 
given in return for Plaintiff's relinquishmznt of any property rigPts. 
Ch January 25, 1977, the matter cane before the court, Plaintiff 
appearing in person and with counsel and I:efendant not appearing. A 
I:ecree of Divorce was signed on February 9, 1977, and incorporated the 
ternis of the Stipulation, Waiver and Property SettleIY1ent (Tr 74-77). 
In July, 1977, Plaintiff sold the hane for $60.000.00 (Tr 136), 
and the rrortgage indebtedness was approximately $13, 000. 00 (Tr 137). 
Plaintiff married Dr. Swithin Qiandler sometirre prior to August 1, 1977, 
(Tr 107). Begirming in August, 1977, I:efendant stopped paying the 
$176.50 to Plaintiff each rronth, and Plaintiff filed an Order To Show Cause 
on 1:-bvernber 14, 1977, asking that I:efendant be directed to pay the 
1.mpaid rrortgage payments and to pay all future rort:gage payments as they 
accrued (Tr 104). In response, I:efendant filed a Motion to Set Aside 
and/or t-bdify Decree and Affidavit in support thereof, alleging that I:efendant 
1.ilderstood and intended the roonthly payrnents of $176.50 to be in the 
nature of support and that said obligation tenninated on Plaintiff's 
remarriage and sale of the home (Tr ) . 
A hearing was held on these matters on January 26, 1978. Although 
District Court Judge Maurice Harding ruled the rront:hly payments to be 
applied to the rrortgage payments were not rrodifiable because they were 
part of a property settlement, he reduced the am:runt to $122.06 to 
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reflect taxes and fire insurance which had been included in the $176.50 
and which he held Defendant was not required to pay. An Order was 
signed by the Judge on September 28, 1978 (Tr 115-116). 
Defendant filed his l'Jotice of Appeal from that Order on October 
25, 1978 (Tr 117). 
POINT I 
THE IDNTHLY PAYMENIS MADE BY DEFENDANT TO PlAINITFF, TO BE APPLIED 
TO THE lDP.TGAGE PAYMENTS, WERE Ill TI-IE NATI.,'RE OF SUPPORT AND SHOUID HAVE 
TERMINATED UPON PI.AilTI'IFF' S REMARRIAGE AND SALE OF THE PROPERTY. 
Defendant's fution to Set Aside and/or fudify Decree dealt with 
the following portion of the Decree ·which was based upon a Stipulation the 
parties had entered into: 
2. That the Plaintiff be and she hereby is awarded 
the parties ' hane located at 2646 fulphin Way, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, as her sole and separate property, free and clear 
of any claim or interest of the Defendant. Defendant be 
and he hereby is ordered to make all rrortgage payrrents 
on said property and to pay off and satisfy any and all liens 
on the property, if any exist. The defendant be 
and he he!l'."eby is additionally ordered to pay the 
Plaintiff the sum of Che Hundred Seventy-six fullars and 
Fifty Cents ($176.50) each m:mth, conmencing :il!mediately, 
to be applied to the rrortgage payrrents on said hare. 
A close look at the language of the disputed provision of the Decree 
discloses significant emissions, the IIDst inportant one being that 
there is no order to the effect that Defendant was to "assuma and pay the 
entire rortgage indebtedness and hold the Plaintiff hannless therefrom"; 
or that he was to make the m:mthly rrortgage payrrents '\mtil such time as 
the IIDrtgage indebtedness is fully paid." In paragraph 4 of the Decree 
it is clearly stated Defendant was to make the remaining payments of 
Plaintiff's vehicle by paying to her $103.05 each m:mth, '\mtil such 
time as the vehicle is fully pt.rrchased and paid for." And in paragraph 
ll of the Decree, Defendant was ordered to 11dssume and pay and hold the 
Plaintiff hannless fran the payrrent of a..1y debts" incurred by the parties 
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during their rrarr:-i_a8e. These specific statements in other paragraphs 
that Defendant was ordered to "assume and pay" the debts and pay until 
the car is "fully purchased and paid for" make such omissions in 
paragraph 2 dealing with the rrortgage payments all the rrore significant. 
There are other :inportant omissions in paragraph 2 such as: what effect 
Plaintiff's remarriage, death, sale of the property or Defendant's 
death "WOUld have on the m:mthly payments; whether they were m:xlifiable 
by either party upon a showing of changed circumstances; and whether 
they were given in consideration for Plaintiff's relinquishment of 
canparable property rights. 
Furthenrore, the paragraph is a!!lbiguous. It states: 
Defendant be and is hereby ordered to make all 
rrortgage payments on said property, and to pay off 
and satisfy any and all liens on the property, if any exist. 
(Errphasis added) 
Since the parties and the Court were aware of the existing nvrtgage 
indebtedness, a reasonable interpretation of the above sentence 
is that Defendant was required to pay any tax liens, rrechanics liens, or 
other such liens of a similar nature, if in fact any existed. It ~d 
not make sense to read it as requiring Defendant to pay off the entire 
mortgage encur.brance since it is obvious from the same paragraph that it 
clearly existed. Defendant does not dispute that he was ordered to pay 
$176.50 each m:mth to Plaintiff to be applied to the TIYJrtgage payments. 
What is disputed is W'l1o is responsible for the outstanding rrortgage 
indebtedness now that the property has been sold and Plaintiff has 
rerm.rried. The language of the Stipulation and Decree does not 
specifically answer this question but is ambiguous. 
vJhere an ambiguity exists in a property settlement agreement approved 
by the court, the agreement must be considered in light of all the circumstances 
surrounding its execution. Vlhere one construction ~d make the contract 
-5-
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mreasonable and irrational, and another equally consistent with its 
language would make it reasonable, the court should interpret it so 
as to lead to a rational result. Smith v. Smith, 351 P. 2d 142 (Wash 1960) 
It VJOUld be an irrational result for the court to interpret the provision 
as an agreenent that Defendant WJuld assurre responsibility for the entire 
rrortgage indebtedness of approximately $13,000.00 even if Plaintiff 
sold the property and remarried. He had already agreed Plaintiff should 
have property estimated at $46,000.00 at the ti.Ire, and in return he 
received property worth either $3,500.00 or $7,500.00. The rrortgage 
indebtedness alone is tWJ or three ti.Ires rrore than the entire property 
received by Lefendant. Since the parties' equity in the hane at the 
ti.Ire of the divorce was rrnre than sufficient to pay off the rrortgage, 
a nnre reasonable interpretation is that Defendant agreed to pay the 
m:nthly payments as support so that Plaintiff could remain living in 
the hane so long as she desired to live there, and that upon sale of 
the hane, Plaintiff VJOUld pay off the rrortgage indebtedness frcxn the 
sales price. 
It is Defendant's position that the executory payments of $176.50 
each m::nth were in the nature of support and should have terminated upon 
Plaintiff's remarriage and sale of the property. The court retains 
equitable jurisdiction to mxlify a diwrce decree for alinony upon a 
showing of changed circumstances, regardless of whether the decree was 
based upon an agreerrent of the parties. Callister v. Callister, 261 
P. 2d 944 (Utah 1953). 
The agreement entered into by the parties entitled"Stipulation, 
Waiver and Property Settlerent for Diwrce"settled claims for alinony 
and support and also settled the parties' property rights by giving 
Plaintiff the home and real property in Utah and giving Defendant ::he 
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land in Florida. The general rule in the majority of jurisdictions in 
such a case is that if the provisons for support are an integral 
and inseparable part of the property settlement, as where the support 
payments are in consideration for a transfer of property, the decree 
based on the agreerient carmot be rodified with respect to the support 
payments. However, where the support provisions are separable fran 
the property provisons, the court can alter the support provisons but 
cannot alter the property provisions 61 ALR 3d §19 (a) p. 590. Defendant 
contends that by statute, Utah Courts are given broader power th.:m other 
jurisdictions and can rrodify even property settlements (Point II). 
However, the trial court held the m:m.thly payments were part of a 
property settlement and non-modifiable. A discussion of cases which have 
dealt with the issue of whether a divorce agreernent was an integrated 
property settlement or whether the support provisons were severable and 
therefore modifiable, is useful in the instant case in interpreting the 
meanine of Plaintiff's and Defendant's agreement. 
This Court is not bound by the trial court's interpretation of 
the agreernent, but rrust make an independent detennination. Egan v. Egan, 
59 Cal. Pptr. 705 (Cal. App. 1967). 
The de:;ignation by the parties of the payments as "alirrony" or as 
constituting a "property settl.rrent" is not controlling. Egan, ~· 
''. . . no rmgic exists in the rere mention of the ~rds al:im:my, property 
settlement, or child support. '' Dreyer v. Dreyer, 519 P. 2d 12, 13 (Wash. App. 
1974). Rather, the courts look at all of the provisions of the agreement 
to detennine if the payments have the indica of support payments or 
whether the payments were given in consideration for a relinquishment 
of the other party's property rif,hts. Prime v. Prime, 139 P.2d 550 (Ore. 1943). 
-7-
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In Becket v. Becket, 77 C.al Rptr. 134 (Cal. App. 1969) the parties 
agreed and the court ordered that the defendant ~d receive rrore than 
half of the carm.mity property, alrrost half of the joint tenancy property, 
some real estate fran Plaintiff's separate property and rnonthly pa)'llE'lts 
of $1,200.00 for 10 years. The c.ourt found the rronthly pa)'llE'lts were 
not reciprocal provisions for the property settlement and therefore 
tenninated upon Defendant's remarriage. The court state:l the general 
rule that: 
The receipt of a disproportionate arrOLmt of property 
and benefits by the defendant results in an :ilq:Jlication 
of intent that the monthly pa)'llE'lts were not a 
reciprocal cons~deration for those provisions relating 
to a division of property. 
77 Cal Rptr. 134,140 
The court also noted significant omissions in the agreerrent and decree 
which are also omitted in the present case. There are no provisions 
in the two cases: (1) dealing with the effect of remarriage; (2) express: 
stating whether the rronthly pa)'llE'ltS constitute reciprocal consideration 
for the property division; or (3) concerning m:xiification of the pa)'llE'lts. 
A case similar to the present one is Barrong vs. Barrong, 549 
P. 2d 530, 532 (Ore. App. 1976). There the agree!E'lt the parties entered 
into and mi.ch was made a part of <the divorce decree provided that the 
wife should have the parties ' residence and: 
" ... There is presently an unpaid balance due 
on the rrortgage of the dwelling . . . and the husband 
agrees to make said pa)'llE'ltS. . . " 
The court held that even though spousal support was not mentioned, 
it could be inferred that both parties really intended the rrortgage 
· pay.mants to be in the nature of support rather than a division of 
property and therefore said sums were m:xiifiable. The agreerrent was 
silent as to the effect of sale of the horre, and remarriage of the wife. 
-8-
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°11'.e court held that the sale of the hane did not tenninate the payments. 
Relevant in its deterr:rination was the fact that the wife only received 
$199.00 fr= the sale of the hane and had to comnence renting a hane 
for herself and the children. The C'.ourt also nodified the prior order 
by setting a termination date for the monthly pa)'l"'eilts for the wife at 
age 62 or remarriage. 
In Garnett v. Garnett, 526 P. 2d 549 (Ore. 1974), the parties entered 
into a settlement which was incorporated into the decree and provided 
that the wife was awarded the home and the husband would pay the insurance, 
taxes, all household utilities and maintain the premises in a liveable 
condition so long as the wife lived in the home. Despite a provision 
in the agreenent and decree that reI'larriage of the wife "WOUld not tenninate 
the husband's obligations, the court held that the executory llI)I'lthly 
payrrents were in the nature of support and separable fran the property 
division, noting that the division of property was substantially equal. 
The court m:>dified the payments by terminating tha:i. because of the wife's 
remarriage. 
Even in cases where the parties have explicitly agreed the decree 
was non-r.ndifiable or that remarriage would not effect the payments, 
the courts have looked behind such language to detennine 1i.f the agreement 
to pay rronthly payments was given as consideration for relinquishment of 
property rig,hts of similar value. If the court finds the payrrents ~e 
not part of a settlerrent of property rights , it will nodify the payments 
upon a showing of substantial change of circumstances, despite language 
in the decree to the contrary. Feves v. Feves, 254 P. 2d 694 (Ore. 1953); 
Prime v. Prime, 139 P.2d 550 (Ore. 1943); and Wright v. Wright, 498 
P.2d 80 (Kan. 1972). 
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The courts do not concern themselves that rruch with the form of 
the payments made by one party, whether they are made in a lump sum, or 
as m:mthly payments for a definite period or indefinite period, or in 
the form of m:mthly rrortgage payments. Nor is the determinative 
element the designation made by the parties as "alirrvny" or "property 
settlement". The critical element in determining whether such payments 
were part of an integrated property settlement, and therefore non-m::xlifiabl 
in the majority of jurisdictions, is whether the agreement to make such 
payments was made in return for a relinauishment of property rights of 
similar value by the other party. 
In the present case, Plaintiff relinquished her rights in property 
worth $3,500.00 or $7,500.00 in return for property valued at $46,000.00 
subject to a m::rrtgage indebtedness of $13,653.46. The greatly disproportia 
share of property received by Plaintiff is a strong indication the m:mthly 
payments of $176.50 were in the nature of support, to enable Plaintiff 
to remain in the home so long as she desired and did not renarry, and 
were not part of an integrated property settlement. 
POrnT II 
THE cruRT RITAINS JURISDICTION 1'0 MODIFY PROPER'.IY SETI'I.EMEr\'ITS 
WHERE THERE HAS BEEN A Wli'ERIAL CPA~ OF CIRCUMSrANCES. 
Should this c.ourt find that the m:mthly payr!le!lts of $176.50 made 
by Defendant .vere not in the nature of support payments but .vere part 
of a distribution of the parties' property rights, it is still within 
the power of a Utah c.ourt to m::xlify such provisions upon a proper showing 
of change of circumstances. 
Section 30-3-5 of the Utah Code Annotated provides that: 
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The court shall have continuing jurisdiction to 
make such subsequent changes or new orders with respect 
to the support and TI'.3.intenance of the parties, 
the custody of the children and their support 
and oaintenance, or the distribution of the property 
as shall be reasonable and necessary. 
This section has been construed "to confer jurisdiction upon the 
court to make such changes in those cases only where there has been 
a change in the circumstance or condition of a party since the entry 
of the original decree." Dixon v. Dixon, 240 P.2d 1211, 1214 (Utah 1952). 
In Dixon, the divorce decree awarded respondent the business property but 
allowed appellant to pay off the indebtedness and receive the entire 
business property should respondent default on the payments. Despite 
appellant's argument that the court had no authority to rrodify the 
decree, since the original decree was final and fixed the property 
rights, the court exercised its powers, considered the equities in the 
case, and m:x:lified the decree concerning the property division upon 
respondent's default in payments. 
The Utah Court again dealt with this question in Iverson v. Iverson 
526 P.2d 1126, 1127 (Utah 1974). It cited Section 30-3-5 of the 
Utah Code Annotated and stated that this includes "the power to take 
property from one spouse and to award it to another where the interests 
of justice so require". The court also stated all aspects of divorce 
proceedings are equitable and the continuing jurisdiction of the court 
is equitable. 
The facts for the Court's consideration are as follows: 
Defendant was ordered to pay $300.00 per rronth alim:my and Plaintiff 
was awarded all of the parties ' interest in the home and real property. 
She sold the hor.E in July, 1977 for $60,000.00. The outstanding rrortgage 
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-indebtedness at that tirre, and presently, is approximately $13,000.00. 
Should Plaintiff be required to pay the rrortgage indebtedness, she will 
still have received property frorn the marriage with a value of $47 ,000.00. 
Defendant received prc:perty frorn the marriage with a value of $3,500.00 
or $7,500.00. 
Since Plaintiff has married Dr. Chandler and sold the hare for a 
substantial arrount,she is no longer in need of rronthly payments from 
Defendant to pay the rrortgage payments. To require Defendant to pay 
the outstanding rrortgage indebtedness, vtrl.ch is ~ or three tirres m:rre 
than the entire property he received, and vtrl.ch 'WOUld give Plaintiff 
property fran the marriage ~rth $60,000.00 and place Defendant in the 
position of having a deficit of $9,500.00 or $5,500.00 (depending on 
the correct value of the Florida property) after ccntributing to the 
acquisition of the marital property for 30 years 'WOUld be tmequitable. 
'lherefore, this Court should exercise its equitable jurisdiction and 
find that Plaintiff's remarriage and sale of the hare, and receipt of 
substantially all of the marital property, relieves the Defendant of any 
obligation of paying the tmpaid m:>rtgage installlrents. 
POOO' III 
A DECREE, FOUNDED UPON A STIPlIT.ATION CX:NI'AINING A MATERIAL MISTAKE 
AND MISUNDERSTANDTI{;, FAILS IN 1HE SAME }WINER AS A CO~ITRACT. 
The issues of support and property division were never litigated. 
Rather, the Court based its decree upon the Stipulation the parties had 
entered into. The Stipulation contained a material mistake in that the 
parties failed to designate exactly what they were agreeing to when they 
agreed that Defendant 'WOUld pay to Plaintiff $176.50 per rocmth to be 
applied to the rrortgage payrnents. The Stipulation was silent as to whether 
the m:mthly payrnents were in the nature of support or were in consideratiCJl 
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fo,_ l:'hintHf's relinquishment of her property rights; how remarriage, 
the death of Defendant, the death of Plaintiff or sale of the home 'WOU.ld 
affect them; and whether or not they were rrodifiable by either party 
upon a change of circumstances. There was not true "rreeting of the minds" 
cmcerning the above-nentimed cmtingencies and therefore no binding 
agreement. 
Plaintiff contends the parties intended the payrrents to continue 
until the full rrortgage indebtedness was paid, regardless of her 
remarriage or sale of the property. HovJever, this was never specifically 
stated. Defendant, however, intended them to be in the nature of support 
and that they 'WOUld terminate upon Plaintiff's remarriage or sale of 
the property. This too was not specifically stated. 
According to Corbin on Contracts, a corrrron fonn of mistake in the 
making of contracts is a mistake as to the meaning of the ~rds and 
expressions used. &>th parties may know with accuracy the ~ds used, 
but understand them differently. If there is rrore than one reasonable 
meaning under the existing circumstances and neither party had reason 
to know of the other's meaning, the contract r:iay be recindable. As 
was stated by Corbin: 
"But if the parties had materially different 
meanings, and neither on knew or had 
reason to know the meaning of the other, 
there is no contract." 
Corbin on Contracts, Vol I, §104 
As was stated by the court in Buol Machine Co. v. Buckens, 153 A.2d 
826, 827; (Conn. 1959): 
''Recission of a contract on the ground of 11Utual mistake 
may be granted in a proper case where the mistake is 
corrm:m to both parties and by reason of it each 
had done what neither intended." 
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If either party was negligent in this case the two parties were 
equally negligent in failing to state precisely what they intended in 
their stipulation. '!here is no reason for penalizing one for the benefit 
of the other where there has been a mutual mistake and the pa.i:ties are 
equally responsible for the mistake. Therefore, this Court should recind 
that provision of the Stipulation concerning the I!DI1thly payrrents to be 
applied to the rrortgage payrrents and mld the sane provision in the decree 
as being unenforcable and remand the case so that the matter can be 
litigated. 
CCNCWSICN 
That portion of the Decree of Divorce dealing with I!DI1thly payrrentl 
of $176.50, to be applied to the rrortgage payrrents, and the parties' 
Stipulation upon which the Decree was based, were ambigu:>us and contained 
critical emissions. Defendant was not specifically ordered to asS\.ma 
and pay the entire unpaid rrortgage installllents despite Plaintiff's 
renarriage and/or sale of the l'x::lte. 
'Ille Decree and 1\greerrent did not state such payrrents were in 
consideration for Plaintiff's relinquisl'ment of her property rights. In fact, 
Plaintiff only relinquished her rights in property having a minimal value~ 
to the property rights Defen:lant relinquished. Plaintiff's receipt of such 
a disproportionate share of the property strongly indicates the rronthly payire 
of $176.50 were not part of an integrated property settlem:mt but were in 
the nature of support and severable from the property settlerrent provisions. 
Th:! material omissions and ambiguity in the stipulation derronstrate 
that there was no ''meeting of the nrinds" as to critical matters. A 
decree founded upon a recindable contract should not be held enforceable. 
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Wh.erher this Cburt finds the payrrents were in the nature of 
supfX)rt and severable frcm the property settlerrent, or whether it finds 
such paynents were part of an integrated property settlement, it should 
exercise its equitable power in reviewing the case, and rrodify the 
disputed provision of the Decree. Considering the material change of 
circumstances, it w:iuld re unequitable to require Defendant to continue 
making the payrrents. Plaintiff has no need of continuing rronthly payments 
to enable her to live in the OO!re since her rerrarriage and the profit 
frcm the sale of the heme is rrore than adequate to pay off the existing 
rrortgage indebtedness, and in addition leave Plaintiff with approximately 
$47,000.00. 
DATED this !}O +iv day of February, 1979. 
RESP:OCTFULLY SUIMITI'ED, 
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lWID DELIVERY CERITFICA1E 
I do hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Brief was hand 
delivered to Hal M. Swenson, Fabian & Clendenin, Eighth Floor, 
Cont~al Bank Building, Salt l.Bke City, Utah 84101, on this 
'd4J day of February, 1979. 
-16-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
